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ARTICLE 
Public Resource Ownership  
and Community Engagement  
in a Modern Energy Landscape 
 
SAMANTHA HEPBURN* 
 
The most important structural solution to the rush toward 
final disormatteider is to restore some harmony between human 
laws and the laws of nature by giving law back to networks of 
communities. 
- Fritjof Capra & Ugo Mattei, “The Ecology of Law”  
 
 
Property belongs to a family of words that, if we can free them 
from the denigrations that shallow politics and social fashion 
have imposed on them, are the words, the ideas, that govern our 
connections with the world and with one another:  
property, proper, appropriate, propriety. 
- Wendell Berry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 *Director, Centre for Energy and Natural Resources Law, Deakin Law 
School, Australia. The author would like to thank the all of participants in her 
2016 seminar at the Harvard Environmental Policy Unit for their helpful 
contributions. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Spectacular increases in global energy demand over the last 
few decades have prompted a corresponding expansion in onshore 
energy production, facilitated by innovative and enabling 
technological advancements.1 Within this context, existing 
resource ownership frameworks have been subjected to increasing 
conflict and tension.2 This has been particularly apparent in public 
 
1. See Ross H. Pifer, A Greener Shade of Blue: Technology and the Shale 
Revolution, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134 (2013) (arguing 
that the technological revolution that underpins the development of shale has 
been responsible for reshaping the United States energy economy). 
2. See Michael M’Gonigle & Louise Takeda, The Liberal Limits of 
Environmental Law: A Green Legal Critique, 30 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1005 (2013) 
(discussing the connectivity between energy growth and resource conflict and 
highlighting importance of implementing a new cultural narrative that looks 
beyond the paradigm of economic growth.); see also Carol M. Rose & Shelley Rose 
Saxer, A Prospective Look at Property Rights, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 721 (2013) 
(where the authors discuss the increasing tensions in ownership paradigms); INT’L 
ENERGY AGENCY, KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS (2016), http://www.iea.org/ 
publications/freepublications/publication/KeyWorld_Statistics_2015.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/VJG7-E595] (providing a statistical analysis of the advancements); U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., INT’L ENERGY OUTLOOK 2016 (2016), http://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2016).pdf [https://perma.cc/YZ4B-JCP4] (Over the past 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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resource frameworks, where ownership regimes have struggled to 
respond to interface schisms between public and private 
entitlements and escalating demand for greater community 
involvement in onshore resource development.3 The deceleration of 
fossil fuel production has contributed to these conflicts because the 
focus is increasingly shifting towards the acceleration of onshore 
gas as a strategic transitional resource within a carbon economy.4 
The scale and form of the conflict in Australia has highlighted core 
structural deficiencies in the public resource framework.5 Public 
resource ownership is grounded in the disaggregation of private 
land from state resource ownership. The implicit assumption is 
that sub-strata resources should be vested in the state because the 
state has the administrative capability to reinject the benefits of 
resource exploitation back into the community. The public interest 
obligations of the state, as resource owner, are assumed to reside 
in efficiency imperatives. The income generated from sub-strata 
resource exploitation is collected by the state and managed for the 
benefit of the public as a whole.6 
In a modern public resource framework, the justification for 
state ownership of sub-surface resources has, however, become 
increasingly unclear. As Huffman has stated, we presume that the 
public management of resources is preferable to the private, 
 
decade, Australia’s domestic gas production has increased by 3.5% and 
approximately 20% of that gas comes from coal bed methane production in 
onshore basins. The United States Energy Information Administration (US EIA) 
has estimated that technically recoverable onshore shale gas deposits in Australia 
to be 396 trillion cubic feet, which is enough gas to meet Australia’s current needs 
for the next 396 years). 
3. See Shannon O’Lear & Paul F. Diehl, The Scope of Resource Conflict: A 
Model of Scale, 12 WHITEHEAD J. DIPL. & INT’L REL. 27 (2011) (the authors outline 
three core elements instrumental to the expansion of resource conflict, those 
being: location, the nature of the stakeholders and the relationship that exists 
between stakeholders). 
4. See generally INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK (2011), 
http://www.worldenergyoutlook.org/goldenageofgas [https://perma.cc/R422-J4LL] 
(describing the existing era as the ‘golden age of gas’). 
5. See Tina Hunter & Michael Weir, Property Rights and Coal Seam Gas 
Extraction: The Modern Property Law Conundrum, 2 PROP. L. REV. 71, 77 (2012). 
6. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 59-60 (1987); see 
generally Ian Murray, The Mineral Resource Rent Tax Is Dead, Long Live 
Resource Rent Taxes?, 40 U.W. AUSTL. L. REV. 111 (2015) (in Australia, even this 
assumption is questionable, given the capacity of the resource sector to minimize 
tax given the broad concessions available under the Petroleum Resource Rent Tax 
Assessment Act). 
3
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however, this presumption is grounded in coded behaviour.7 The 
actual situation is that public management of resources limits or 
controls the way in which private or special interests affect 
resource allocation. Thus, if the objective is to maximise the net 
benefits to all members of society, whilst at the same time ensuring 
fairness in the costs and benefits of that management, it is by no 
means clear that this is achieved by the conferral of controlled 
ownership of public resources in the state.8 
This article argues the social, environmental and ecological 
complexity of onshore resource expansion requires a corresponding 
expansion in the public interest responsibilities owed by the state, 
as public resource owner. Public interest should not be treated as 
a presumptive fact and must involve a vigorous investigation by 
the state of the benefit and utility of each resource development 
proposal. This must necessarily include a thorough evaluation of 
all competing interests. A critical element in this process is the 
inclusion of community participation processes, ensuring that 
effective and transparent communication and disclosure protocols 
with community representatives are conducted. Public interest 
responsibilities are not satisfied where it is clear that resource 
development decisions have not been subjected to strong 
community engagement protocols. Public interest in the social, 
economic and environmental impacts of resource development 
must be evaluated through connection, disclosure, engagement 
and integration.9 
The article is divided into five parts. Following the 
introduction, Part two evaluates the operational deficiencies 
associated with public resource frameworks in the context of an 
expanding onshore energy landscape. The public resource 
framework in Australia is based upon the largely unexamined 
fragmentation between surface ownership and sub-surface 
 
7. James L. Huffman, Public Land Management in an Age of Deregulation 
and Privatization, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 29, 30 (1989). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 29-31 (discussing the problems connected with the public and 
private divide within public resource frameworks, noting that in order to 
maximize net social benefit within a public resource framework, more attention 
must be paid to the fundamental choice between public and private control); see 
also James K. Boyce, From Natural Resources to Natural Assets, in NATURAL 
ASSETS: DEMOCRATIZING ENVIRONMENTAL OWNERSHIP 7 (James K. Boyce & Barry 
G. Shelley eds., 2003). 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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resources.10 This ownership disaggregation has generated a 
number of schisms that have not been effectively addressed by 
either common law or statute.11 This part examines the 
uncertainty, confusion and conflict generated by this 
fragmentation. It argues that these difficulties alter the 
underlying public interest responsibilities held by the state. Public 
interest within an ownership framework divided by unclear 
common law and statutory boundaries depends upon the 
implementation of improved governance that articulates public 
and private domains and clarifies how communities connect and 
engage with these domains.12 
Part three examines two core social obligation doctrines that 
reinforce the importance of broad responsive public interest 
obligations. The first is the public trust doctrine and the second is 
the doctrine of propriety and the associated jurisprudence of land 
ethics. 
The public trust doctrine imposes trust obligations on the state 
over public natural resources and in so doing, ensures ongoing 
state supervision of those resources.13 This part argues that the 
public trust doctrine should either by applied in Australia or, its 
core tenets should influence a stronger development of public 
 
10. See Boyce, supra note 9, at 24 (The author notes that in practice, despite 
the potency of landowner control, property rights are neither fully specified or 
immutable. Thus, as societies change, so does the way in which they define and 
allocate property.). 
11. Robert J. Duffy, Political Mobilization, Venue Change and the Coal Bed 
Methane Conflict in Montana and Wyoming, 45 NAT. RESOURCE J. 409, 414 (2005) 
(noting that land disputes are an issue for both public and private resource 
frameworks because to the frustration of landowners, mineral rights under both 
frameworks will generally take precedence over surface rights.); see generally 
Pamela O’Connor, Sharon A. Christensen, William D. Duncan, & Angela Phillips, 
Regulation of Land Access for Resource Development: A Coal Seam Gas Case 
Study from Queensland, 21(2) AUSTL. PROP. L.J. 110 (discussing the issue in the 
public resource framework noting some of the difficulties connected with private 
land access agreements which landholders and third parties enter into). 
12. See Eric Freyfogle, Goodbye to the Public-Private Divide, 36 ENVTL. L. 7, 
23 (2006) (arguing that the future is likely to see new and innovative ways in 
which the public interest in land will be identified and protected.). 
13. See Michael C. Blumm, The Public Trust Doctrine and Private Property: 
The Accommodation Principle, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 649, 650 (2010); see also 
Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 712 (Cal. 1983) (holding that 
“the core of the public trust doctrine is the state’s authority as sovereign to 
exercise a continuous supervision and control over the navigable waters of the 
state and the land underlying those waters”). 
5
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interest duties in order to promote a more rigorous integration of 
community engagement protocols. The irreducible core of the 
public trust doctrine is posited on the assumption that property 
rights need to be responsive to evolving social and environmental 
concerns, and therefore must adapt to suit the needs of a changing 
community.14 Public resource ownership generates strong 
communitarian responsibilities and should be exercised in a 
manner that is consistent with broader social welfare objectives.15 
Land and natural resources are a component of an interconnected 
habitat, which means ownership, should not be treated as an 
autonomous entitlement. As outlined by the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin in Just v. Marinette County, an owner of land has “no 
absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural 
character of his land so as [to] use it for a purpose for which it was 
unsuited in its natural state and which injures the rights of 
others.”16 The public trust doctrine uses trust duties to encourage 
the state to exercise their trust responsibilities by reference to the 
correlative entitlements of the community of life that exists around 
them.17 These principles have, in turn, encouraged an ecological 
reconstruction of ownership norms.18 
The doctrine of propriety and the jurisprudence of land ethics 
are established social obligation principles that seek to impose 
stronger social responsibilities upon land and resource owners. The 
 
14. The most significant public trust decision in the United States was 
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892); see Joseph L. Sax, 
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial 
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 489 (1970) (describing Illinois Central 
Railroad Co. v. Illinois as the most celebrated case in American public trust law); 
see also Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 412 (1987) 
(examining the legal rules that limit the power of the legislature to dispose of 
public property.) 
15. See generally Joseph William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 
40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (noting that resource ownership attracts variable). 
16. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (1968). 
17. See Sax, supra note 14, at 473 (noting that the public trust doctrine is 
one of the only legal concepts available in America which has the breadth and 
substantive content to allow it to respond to community concerns regarding 
natural resource management); see also Jennifer A. Kreder, The Public Trust, U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 1425, 1446 (2016) (noting that the public trust is a trust for the 
benefit of the people and public good rather than a prerogative for the advantage 
of the government or the benefit of private individuals). 
18. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 631, 650 (1996). 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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doctrine of propriety builds upon the core Aristotelian notion that 
the human being is a social and political animal and cannot be self-
sufficient when functioning from a purely individualistic 
perspective.19 Land ethics are a body of ethical premises relevant 
to the ownership of land.20 The core assumption is that the 
decisions landowners make require greater collaborative input 
from the community in which the land exists because land is an 
integral part of our habitat. Land ethics provide a normative 
framework that encompasses the value of personhood and the 
important goal of enhanced social welfare.21 Ownership 
frameworks need to be informed by principles of propriety and 
public good because they focus upon social relations rather than 
pure market value giving them greater normative appeal.22 
Part four of the article examines the growing importance of 
social licensing protocols in the assessment and approval of 
onshore resource titles. It argues that this trend provides formal 
acknowledgement from industry that community engagement 
protocols have become public interest responsibilities.23 The social 
license to operate is an important device for industries operating 
within the onshore resource sector as so many projects increasingly 
depend upon community approval in order to function without 
disruption. Social licensing mirrors the legal licensing process from 
 
19. This concept is grounded in the jurisprudence known as ‘virtue ethics,’ 
which adopts an ethical perspective that seeks to emphasis virtues or moral 
character in contradistinction to duties, rules or the consequences of actions. As 
outlined by Rosalind Hursthouse, “[a] utilitarian will point to the fact that the 
consequences of doing so will maximize well-being, a deontolotist to the fact that, 
in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as ‘Do 
unto others as you would be done by’ and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping 
the person would be charitable or benevolent.” See ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE, ON 
VIRTUE ETHICS 1 (Oxford University Press ed., 1999); see also RICHARD KRAUT, 
ARISTOTLE ON THE HUMAN GOOD 15-54 (1989) (discussing the Aristotelian 
perspective). 
20. See Eduardo M. Peñalver, Land Virtues, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 821, 855-58 
(2009) (arguing that virtue ethics offers a more effective approach to land-use 
policy than economics because it has the capacity to take account of 
incommensurable values). 
21. Id. at 863. 
22. Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1035 (2009). 
23. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1017, 1023 (2011) (noting that social obligation theorists argue that property 
owners are both right and duty-holders). 
7
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a communitarian perspective, confirming that resource 
development is socially acceptable to the community in which it 
operates.24 In this respect, social licencing operates as an auxiliary, 
non-mandatory process. In many ways however, social licensing 
has become more significant for industries operating in this sector 
because it improves the reputational legitimacy of the industry.25 
This part examines recent examples of social licensing to illustrate 
how community engagement has influenced corporate social 
strategies. 
II. PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 
A. Public and Private Ownership Models 
Land and natural resources are privy to ownership under 
either public or private ownership frameworks. The adoption of one 
or other of these ownership regimes for the management and 
exploitation of land and natural resources is largely a consequence 
of history and legislative context.26 It is also, inevitably, the 
consequence of market efficiencies.27 The public ownership of sub-
surface natural resources is formally justified on the grounds that 
it provides governments with economic benefits that may be 
distributed for community benefit.28 On this basis, the Australia 
public resource framework assumes that whilst land may be 
subject to public or private ownership, the natural resources 
residing within the land are owned by the state and this 
 
24. See generally Jen Schneider, Barriers to Engagement: Why it is Time for 
Oil and Gas to Get Serious about Public Communication, OIL AND GAS FACILITIES: 
CULTURAL MATTERS (Apr. 2013), https://www.academia.edu/3291942/Barriers_to_ 
Engagement_Why_it_is_Time_for_Oil_and_Gas_to_Get_Serious_about_Public_C
ommunication [https://perma.cc/3US7-YHHR]. 
25. See Don C. Smith & Jessica M. Richards, Social License to Operate: 
Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges Facing the Oil & Gas Industry, 1(2) OIL 
& GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 81 (2015). 
26. Id. 
27. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. 
REV. PAPERS & PROC. 347, 350 (1967) (where the author argues that property 
regimes will inevitably seek reallocation towards the most efficient system). 
28. This market based efficiency response to natural resource management 
has been rejected by environmental ethicists; see, e.g., Mark Sagoff, On Preserving 
the Natural Environment, 84 YALE L.J. 205, 225 (1974) (noting that realistically 
there is no economic or even utilitarian rationale available for preserving the 
natural environment). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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entitlement is formalized through the implementation of explicit 
statutory vesting provisions.29 Private landowners in a public 
resource framework retain common law entitlements to the surface 
estate. Public resources are conceptually disaggregated from the 
bundle of rights that make up the land estate despite corporeal 
integration.30 
This framework has historical roots in the regalian system, 
whereby the minerals existing within the ground were assumed to 
belong to the king as the head of the state because this was for the 
greatest advantage of society.31 In a modern context, these 
historical assumptions form strong efficiency and management 
rationales.32 The postulation is that valuable sub-surface 
resources should be properly and strategically managed by the 
state to ensure that the economic benefits of commercial 
exploitation are proportionately distributed to all members of the 
public.33 Theoretically, revenue generated by the 
commercialization of sub-surface resources is re-injected back into 
 
29. Public resource ownership is operational in all states and territories in 
Australia. See generally Yinka Omorogbe & Peter Oniemola, Property Rights in 
Oil and Gas Under Domanial Regimes, in PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN ENERGY AND 
NATURAL RESOURCES 115, 118 (Aileen McHarg et. al. eds., 2010) (discussing the 
operational distinctions of private and public resource frameworks). 
30. SAMANTHA HEPBURN, MINING AND ENERGY LAW IN AUSTRALIA 11 (2015) 
(noting that the public resource framework depends upon the fragmentation of 
land and resource ownership despite their physical coalescence, through 
legislative intervention.). 
31. The term “regalian” refers to the right that the entire State, represented 
by the King, reserves to itself to dispose of the ownership of the underground as 
if it were public property, independent of the private property of the land which 
contains it and to do so for the benefit of society. See Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra 
note 29, at 120. 
32. PROPERTY AND THE LAW IN NATURAL RESOURCES, supra note 29, at 12 
(noting that ownership arrangements that separate land from mineral resources 
are good for state planning and administration but lay the foundation for conflict 
between public and private domains); see also Patrick Wieland, Going Beyond 
Panaceas: Escaping Mining Conflicts in Resource-Rich Countries Through 
Middle-Ground Policies, 20 N.Y.U ENVTL. L.J. 199, 209 (2013) (citing Emeka 
Duruigbo, The Global Energy Challenge and Nigeria’s Emergence as a Major Gas 
Power: Promise, Peril or Paradox of Plenty?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 395, 440 
(2009)) (arguing that the main rationalization for public ownership of natural 
resources is that resources should be considered ‘public property’ to ensure that 
they are conserved and managed for the welfare of all citizens). 
33. See Mario J. Rizzo, The Mirage of Efficiency, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 641, 642 
(1980) (arguing that the efficiency norm is oblique and largely impractical because 
its success depends upon large informational input). 
9
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the community thereby improving public protection.34 This 
rationale overlooks broader social values because, as 
environmental ethicists have argued, economic analysis tends to 
make efficiency our primary goal as it is based upon the 
assumption that efficiency corresponds with market preference.35 
A private resource framework is not disaggregated in this way. 
Ownership of the land and the resource are treated as a cohesive 
totality unless and until the landowner decides to sever the 
resource and create a mineral estate.36 Any such decision will 
depend upon individual landowner preference and any unitization 
obligations.37 The natural resources residing within the sub-strata 
of the land continue to be vested in the landowner and, subject to 
the rule of capture and any relevant statutory governance, the 
decision to exploit the resources resides with the private owner 
unless and until the lands are publically acquired.38 
The public and private ownership frameworks are sourced in 
two fundamentally different theories. Private resource ownership 
is grounded in the theory of accession, which assumes that the 
surface estate and the subsoil exist as a single cohesive ownership 
unit because, in accordance with natural law, the two are 
inherently indivisible.39 The theory of accession is encapsulated 
 
34. The classic argument is that public goods must be managed by the state 
because private producers would not have an incentive to manage them efficiently 
and in accordance with public interest; see Carol M. Rose, The Comedy of the 
Commons: Customs, Commerce and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 
711, 717-19 (1986). 
35. See ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, Public Interest in Private Land, in THE LAND WE 
SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003). 
36. See BARLOW BURKE & ROBERT BECK, THE LAW AND REGULATION OF 
MINING: MINERALS AND ENERGY 59 (2010). 
37. See Wieland, supra note 32, at 206. Within a private ownership 
framework it is up to landowners to decide whether to exploit the resource and 
this means that it is possible for different landowners to diverge in land use 
preference. Unitization may occur where multiple owners of mineral rights to an 
oil or gas field are subject to contractual obligations to minimize redundant 
drilling and extraction processes. See Gary D. Libecapp & Steven N. Wiggins, 
Contractual Responses to the Common Pool: Prorationing of Crude Oil Production, 
74 AM. ECON. REV. 87, 87-89 (1984). 
38. Boyce, supra note 9, at 25. 
39. See Earl C. Arnold, The Law of Accession of Personal Property, 22 COLUM. 
L. REV. 103, 103 (1922) (where the author outlines the different categories of 
accession which include that of ‘confusion’ or ‘commixture,’ which amounts to the 
intermixing of two similar things which cannot be distinguished); see also T. T. 
Clarke, The Law of Accession, 14 J. JURIS. 165 (1870) (noting that accession 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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within the ad coelum maxim, a common law principle that assumes 
that the owner of land retains rights to the minerals and resources 
in the sub-strata where those minerals are inextricably connected 
to the sub-strata.40 The essential rationale of the ad coelum maxim 
is that physical connectivity denotes ownership. Consequently, the 
central design feature of the private resource framework is that 
private landowners capture all ‘increments in value that are 
prominently connected with the owned asset.’41 
The public resource framework is grounded in the theory of 
separation.42 The theory of separation assumes that a surface 
estate is inherently divisible from the subsoil, and therefore 
minerals and hydrocarbons residing within the subsoil may be 
disaggregated from that sub-stratum.43 In most public resource 
frameworks the statutory disaggregation occurs via explicit 
statutory vesting provisions. The vesting provisions allow minerals 
and hydrocarbons to be exploited directly by the state, and this in 
turn, allows the state to issue concessions to third parties. Where 
a concession is issued, and a third party acquires a resource title, 
ownership in the resource will generally remain with the state 
until extraction and subsequent transfer to a third party 
purchaser.44  
 
necessarily arises where the union of two things is so intimate that the one 
becomes a mere constituent part of the other, and its individuality is destroyed). 
40. For a discussion of the ad coelum principle, see generally Owen L. 
Anderson, Lord Coke, The Restatement, and Modern Subsurface Trespass Law, 6 
TEX. J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 203 (2011) (noting that ad coelum maxims assert 
that the surface owner retains ownership of all sub-surface strata down to the 
center of the earth. This has, however, been qualified and the author notes that 
United States courts have universally rejected a strict adherence to the ad coelum 
principle preferring to base recovery on proof of actual and substantial harm.). 
41. Thomas W. Merrill, Accession and Original Ownership, 1 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 459, 477-78 (2009) (arguing that prominent connection is “hard-wired 
in the psychology of human perception” so that there are “strong psychological 
forces that equate physical connectedness with ownership”). 
42. Boyce, supra note 9. 
43. Id.; see also Nicholas J. Campbell, Jr., Principles of Mineral Ownership 
in the Civil Law and Common Law Systems, 31 TUL. L. REV. 303, 310 (1956) 
(noting that state ownership of minerals is more prevalent in civil law countries). 
44. For example, the regulation of minerals and hydro-carbons in the public 
resource system in Australia where legislative provisions explicitly state that 
ownership of the resource remains with the state until transfer. See, e.g., Mineral 
Resources (Sustainable Development) Act 1990 s 11(2) (Austl.) (setting out that 
minerals that are separated from the land remain the property of the state). 
11
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B. Disaggregation of Resources from Land 
The bifurcation of land and resource ownership within a public 
resource framework has generated strong delineational tensions 
particularly where surface estate activities conflict with the 
resource extraction processes.45 The blurred nature of the 
ownership interface means that the division between the control 
rights held by the landowner (a common law ownership concept) 
and the control rights held by the resource owner (a statutory 
ownership concept) are indeterminate. This has generated 
inevitable legal and conceptual collisions.46 
This collision is particularly manifest in Australia in the vexed 
issue of land access for holders of onshore resource titles seeking 
access to sub-surface resources within privately owned land. The 
prevailing assumption is that the private landowner may preclude 
access to the public resource titleholder.47 This assumption is not 
legislatively supported, and, further, is fundamentally 
inconsistent with public interest imperatives that depend upon the 
efficient exploitation of resources for the benefit of the community 
as a whole. 
Formally, the problem is a consequence of the unclear wording 
in the vesting provisions. The nature of the state’s interest in the 
resource, and its connection with any underlying radical title to the 
land, is not defined, meaning that the entitlements of the private 
 
45. See Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 
1163, 1173 (1999) (discussing the importance of boundaries in private ownership 
and noting that boundary rules are intrinsic, constitutive elements of well-
functioning private property regimes that seek to limit spatial fragmentation 
through direct and indirect mechanisms); see also Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. 
Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill & 
Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus 
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000). 
46. See generally Bobbier Johnson, Coalbed Methane Ownership Rights in 
Wyoming, 8 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 46 (2004) (discussing the problem 
of individual entitlements in the context of overlapping resources in coalbed 
methane sites). 
47. See JULIAN BODENMANN, MATTHEW CAMERON, KATHRYN O’HARE & EMMA 
ROSE-SOLOMAN, RESEARCH NOTE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY INTO THE RIGHTS OF 
LANDHOLDERS TO PREVENT ACCESS TO LAND BY MINING COMPANIES 44 (2012), 
http://www.law.uq.edu.au/documents/pro-bonocentre/publications/Research-note 
-comparative-study-landholders-rights-July-2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/CT3G-4P 
5K] (noting that none of the jurisdictions in Australia afford the landholder a 
general power of veto over land access). 
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landowners, particularly any right to veto access, is unclear.48 
Statutory property rights can arise through the validation of a pre-
conceived entitlement or through the creation of new property with 
unknown internal configuration.49 The vesting provisions make no 
attempt to explain how the interest has arisen. Thus, the right is 
assumed to pre-exist the implementation of the vesting provision. 
This is further complicated by the fact that prior to the 
implementation of the vesting provisions, the resource had no pre-
existence because it was subject to the common law doctrine of 
accession.50 
This delineational uncertainty raises deeper structural 
concerns about the articulation and distribution of public interest 
responsibilities. All ownership frameworks must be predicated 
upon the existence and enforcement of a set of rules that articulate 
and define the scope and boundary of entitlements. This is 
particularly crucial in a public resource framework where public 
and private interests intermingle.51 Property rights in natural 
resources cannot simply emerge particularly, as Ostrom has noted, 
in complex overlapping environments.52 
Boundary rules are important because they prevent the over-
accumulation of overlapping rights in a commons resource as well 
 
48. See Newcrest Mining (WA) Ltd v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 513 
(Austl.) (discussing the connection between radical title and issued resource 
titles). 
49. See Mathew Storey, Not of this Earth: The Extraterrestrial Nature of 
Statutory Property in the 21st Century, 25 AUSTL. RESOURCES & ENERGY L.J. 51, 
54 (2006) (discussing the different ways of articulating the scope and nature of 
statutory property); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
(1964) (describing government discretion within regulatory frameworks as an 
important new form of property). 
50. See Merrill, supra note 41, at 467 (discussing the doctrine of accession 
and noting that ad coelum is a sub-category of the doctrine of accession). 
51. Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 
1870-71 (2012) (noting that the collection of norms and doctrinal tools governing 
conflict vary but the more social the institution, the greater the collective input); 
see also HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 232-37 (2011) 
(arguing that property frameworks need to facilitate greater cooperation amongst 
intersecting interests). 
52. See Elinor Ostrom, Private and Common Property Rights, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 334 (2000), http://reference.findlaw.com/ 
lawandeconomics/2000-private-and-common-property-rights.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/DE5M-SZED] (noting that “rules and rulers are required to establish, monitor 
and enforce a property system”). 
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as the over-accumulation of rights of exclusion in an anti-commons 
environment.53 The absence of boundary rules generates distrust 
and concern. This, in turn, exacerbates conflict resulting in 
stakeholders being forced to resort to private treaty. This 
inevitably externalises broader community members from private 
resource arrangements and diminishes public confidence in the 
state management processes. Ownership frameworks for natural 
resources must be explicable and coherent as they play a crucial 
role in advancing the normative vision of how society and the policy 
that governs it should be structured.54 
C. Public Interest Obligations 
Public resource frameworks aim to implement an optimal 
interactive framework between humans and natural resources via 
the intermediary of the state.55 The state, as de jure owner of the 
commons resource, must ensure that in exercising ownership 
entitlements in public resources, it acts in a manner that 
maximises public interest.56 This is an onerous responsibility, 
particularly given the dramatic changes occurring within the 
onshore resource landscape. The increased connectivity between 
ownership norms, ecological imperatives and market forces has 
fundamentally shifted public interest beyond economic 
imperatives.57 Neo-classical efficiency rationales no longer 
adequately capture the inherent value of the human-nature 
 
53. See Heller, supra note 45, at 1194; see also Michael A. Heller, The 
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 624 (1998) (outlining the broad anti-commons framework). 
54. GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS 
OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 1-2 (1997). 
55. Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 45, at 555-59 (noting that ownership 
frameworks reflect an outdated repertoire of the categories of human interaction). 
56. See Omorogbe & Oniemola, supra note 29, at 118; see also Ostrom, supra 
note 52, at 335-37 (differentiating between open access resource ownership and 
common resource ownership and noting that de jure government property regimes 
often lack resources to monitor effective usage, particularly in developing 
countries). 
57. See Lynda L. Butler, The Pathology of Property Norms: Living Within 
Nature’s Boundaries, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 927, 938 (2000) (outlining the connectivity 
between economics and individualism in ownership norms). 
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continuum.58 A monistic view of public interest ignores social and 
environmental considerations that transcend market economics. 
In The Tragedy of the Commons, Hardin argued that open 
access by all members of the community would encourage over 
consumption and degradation of common resources.59 Hardin 
argued that the commons locks people into a system that compels 
them to increase in a world that is limited because “ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.”60 
This is further encapsulated in the Aristotelian notion, “that which 
is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon 
it.”61 
One of the difficulties with articulating a broader 
conceptualization of public interest lies in the deeply entrenched 
notion that public resources must be controlled and the conferral 
of autonomy and entitlement is, in itself, a public benefit. Hardin 
argued that controlled ownership of commons resources presents a 
more effective management option for commons resources because 
it combats the overconsumption and collective degradation which 
can flow from an open access regime where unmitigated self-
interest reigns.62 Hardin did not consider in any detail how private 
ownership regimes might themselves degrade common resources. 
 
58. See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Climate Change, Cultural Transformation, 
and Comprehensive Rationality, 31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 555, 588 (2004) 
(arguing that questions of what we want in the context of climate change “depend 
not on cost-benefit balancing, but rather on the will of the global community to 
conceive of and to realize a transformation of culture toward some shared ideal”). 
59. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1248 (1968), 
http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/162/3859/1243.full.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/SX7F-LR5E] (arguing that avoiding the tragedy of overexploitation of the 
commons means that the community must willingly surrender the unfettered 
“freedom” that characterizes common ownership). 
60. Id. at 1244. 
61. Aristotle, Discussion of Ideal States, in THE POLITICS AND CONSTITUTION 
OF ATHENS, BOOK II, at 33 (Stephen Everson ed., 2d ed. 1996). 
62. See Hardin, supra note 58; see also James E. Krier, The Tragedy of the 
Commons, Part Two, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 329-30 (1992) (explaining 
Terry Anderson and Donald Leal’s argument that it is wiser to harness self 
interest than to preach against it, and that social institutions need to provide 
constructive incentives and this is exactly what private property and free markets 
offer); Martin Froněk, The Tragedy of the Commons: Four Decades Later, 11 
COMMON L. REV. 16, 18 (2010) (noting that private rights encourage owners to 
care for and preserve the resource); Demsetz, supra note 27, at 348. 
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Overuse by private entities licensed by the state has, in the 
absence of effective oversight, produced degradation and 
overconsumption. The consequences have been particularly dire 
where it involves the destruction or diminution of crucial commons 
resources.63 
For example, unconventional gas production has the capacity 
to significantly deplete or contaminate groundwater aquifers 
because large volumes of sub-surface water may be removed 
during the extraction process. This may cause irreversible damage 
to the water tables.64 Groundwater is a crucial source of water in 
an age when surface supply of water has become less reliable and 
predictable. Groundwater is also a particularly important source 
of supply in times of drought. Detailed research about the state of 
groundwater supplies is yet to be carried out because of the cost 
and complexity associated with monitoring large aquifer systems. 
Recent studies have, however, revealed that groundwater systems 
across the globe are experiencing significant stress, with the large-
scale depletion apparent in the Canning Basin in Australia being 
directly linked to onshore mining activities in the region.65 
Many subsequent property theorists have critiqued Hardin’s 
essay. Heller argued that strong exclusionary rights in parcelized 
land might actually lead to an unproductive ‘anti-commons’ 
tragedy.66 The anti-commons represent the inverse of the open-
 
63. See Carol M. Rose, Energy and Efficiency in the Realignment of Common-
Law Water Rights, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 261 (1990); see also Carol M. Rose, A Dozen 
Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New Takings Legislation, 
53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 267 (1996) (arguing that Anglo-American legal 
principles recognized both private property rights and public rights, particularly 
in resources that are not easily turned into private property, and that takings law 
is essentially an effort to balance public and private rights as they evolve over 
time). 
64. See M. Alexander Pearl, The Tragedy of the Vital Commons, 45 ENVTL. L. 
1021, 1053 (2015) (arguing that the restoration of the “vital commons” is difficult 
and exhaustion is extremely dire due to the essential nature of the resource, 
“[o]veruse leading to depletion is the epitome of apocalypse”). 
65. Two University of California, Irvine studies indicate that a third of the 
groundwater basins across the globe are in distress. See Alexandra S. Richey et 
al., Quantifying Renewable Groundwater Stress with GRACE, 51 WATER 
RESOURCES RES. 5217, 5228 (2015); Alexandra S. Richey et al., l , Uncertainty in 
Global Groundwater Storage Estimates in a Total Groundwater Stress 
Framework, 51 WATER RESOURCE RES. 5198 (2015). 
66. See Heller, supra note 53, at 624 (arguing that with too many owners of 
property fragments, resources become prone to waste either through overuse in a 
16https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
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access problem in that conferral of multiple rights of exclusion can 
actually result in land and resources being utilized inefficiently.67 
In an anti-commons tragedy, “too many individuals have rights of 
exclusion over” a specified piece of property, and this excessive 
fragmentation generates widespread under-utilization of valuable 
resources.68 Private owners are encouraged to hold out for high 
prices and this can often mean valuable resources go unused.69 It 
can also produce high transaction costs resulting in welfare-
enhancing improvements being overlooked.70 
Carol Rose argued that open access utilisation of commons 
resources is not always tragic, particularly where it reveals a 
common benefit. She noted that the increased utilisation of a 
common resource could, in some situations, stimulate greater 
investment and return.71 Elinor Ostrom argued that users of the 
commons could overcome the ‘tragedy’ scenario connected with the 
overconsumption and degradation of commons resources where 
well-structured governance and management regimes have been 
implemented.72 
Predicting behaviour within a commons framework is difficult 
given the infinite contextual and social variations that can exist.73 
The commons is, necessarily, a public domain as it contains a 
 
commons or underuse in an anti-commons. Well-functioning property regimes 
prevent such waste by drawing boundaries that constrain owner’s choices about 
fragmentation). 
67. Inefficiency in this context refers in the pure sense to the Pareto 
principle. A situation is Pareto ‘optimal’ or Pareto ‘efficient’ if there is no 
alternative which would constitute a Pareto ‘improvement.’ Gerard Debreu, 
Valuation Equilibrium and Pareto Optimum, 40 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 588, 588 
(1954). 
68. Heller, supra note 53, at 677. 
69. For further discussion on the anti-commons, see Heller, supra note 53, at 
633-640. See also Edward J. Janger, Privacy Property, Information Costs, and the 
Anticommons, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 899, 921 (2003). 
70. See Heller, supra note 53, at 688. 
71. See Rose, supra note 34, at 768. 
72. ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 88-102 (1990) (providing a list of different 
circumstances where such well-structured systems have worked effectively). 
73. See generally E. Donald Elliott, The Tragi-comedy of the Commons: 
Evolutionary Biology, Economics and Environmental Law, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 17 
(2001) (noting that the complexity of commons resources and of human 
interactions and reactions to those resources makes it difficult to predict commons 
behavior). 
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diverse array of natural and cultural resources, each of which have 
multiple dimensions. The conferral of de jure ownership rights to 
the state in commons resources must therefore be subject to broad, 
evolving public interest responsibilities that transcend ownership 
paradigms and connect to the comprehensive public management 
obligations of the state. 
These obligations have progressed significantly in the context 
of natural resource ownership. There has been a clear 
delineational shift away from the early preservationist perspective 
of environmental legislation, which was directed at the actions of 
governmental agencies, to more recent preventionist legislation, 
directed at the actions of private individuals.74 Within this context, 
the community has become more attuned to the obligation of the 
state, as public resource owner, to manage common resources in 
accordance with progressive social welfare issues.75 
Public participation and community engagement protocols 
have a much higher significance within this context.76 Community 
engagement in this context has evolved into a strong public 
interest responsibility. Determining which communities are 
affected by resource development and how those communities feel 
about the prospect of such development is increasingly crucial 
because it provides important insight into social attitudes and 
behaviour.77 
 
74. Cf. Allan Kanner & Mary E. Zeigler, Understanding and Protecting 
Natural Resources, 17 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 119, 122 (2006) (noting that 
there has been a shift from a ‘great places’ approach to natural resources to a 
‘reclaiming’ approach). 
75. See, e.g., Paul Rose, The Management of Public Natural Resource Wealth 
22-25 (Ohio St. Moritz Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 191, 2013) (examining 
governance of natural resource funds). 
76. For a discussion on the importance of holistic ownership and community 
engagement in unconventional gas expansion, see David E. Pierce, Carol Rose 
Comes to the Oil Patch: Modern Property Analysis Applied to Modern Reservoir 
Problems, 19 PA. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 241, 245-46 (2011) (arguing that individual 
rights to oil and gas reservoirs, where many individuals possess similar rights 
and duties, each impact the community and should be viewed as affirmative 
correlative rights which more completely recognize private individuals rights, 
particularly in regards to their “status as a member of the reservoir community”). 
77. See David Lametti, The Concept of Property: Relations Through Objects 
of Social Wealth, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 325, 366 (2003) (arguing that private 
property should be framed, particularly in the context of public resources, as 
spectrum metaphor for property entitlements and responsibilities). 
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The state cannot make decisions that maximize social good if 
it does not fully understand or appreciate the nature and texture 
of the community, what its priorities are and the potential impact 
of a public resource decision upon that community.78 The deep-
rooted notion that the public has no legitimate societal interest in 
decisions made within the private ownership domain has no 
relevance to public resources owned the by state. This is 
particularly true given the potent issues that underpin 
environmental management, ecological sustainability and bio-
diversity.79 Non-engagement with communitarian values and 
perspectives disconnects common resources from their evolving 
social and ecological macrocosm.80 
D. The Onshore Resource Sector and Co-operative 
Governance 
Public resource systems need to be reconfigured to properly 
support and facilitate a broader public interest imperative that 
takes greater account of co-operative governance norms.81 The 
state, as resource owner, must ensure that the public, as resource 
users, are informed and connected. Co-operative governance 
depends upon the facilitation of collaborative processes. In a public 
 
78. Cf. Alexander, supra note 23 (presenting theories of property where 
ownership comes with obligations of support towards the community); John 
O’Neill, Property, Care and Environment, 19 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 695, 
696 (2001) (noting that “[c]are for particular places which embody the life of a 
community [. . .] is often expressed through resistance to liberal property rights”). 
79. Joseph L. Sax, Ownership, Property, and Sustainability, 31 UTAH ENVTL. 
L. REV. 1, 10 (2011) (noting that “understanding the nature of sustenance and 
biodiversity calls for a rethinking of our assumptions about landownership”). 
80. Cf. Myrl L. Duncan, Reconceiving the Bundle of Sticks: Land as a 
Community-Based Resource, 32 ENVTL. L. 773, 780 (2002) (arguing that one of the 
most serious flaws in the bundle of rights metaphor lies in the treatment of 
individual parcels of land as “free standing and unrelated to other bundles or the 
larger community”). 
81. For a discussion on the nature and importance of co-operative governance 
norms, see John R. Nolon & Steven E. Gavin, Hydrofracking: State Preemption, 
Local Power, and Cooperative Governance, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 995, 1037 
(2013) (noting that the adoption of bans may be the product of political reaction 
and reflective of the fact that communities may not have access to best practices 
in law and/or science, which may be overcome by state agencies investing time 
and money in creating a regulatory framework that implements a co-operative 
state-local approach to controlling local impacts and promoting regional 
interests). 
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resource framework, collaboration is incentivized through the 
implementation of normative behavioural standards that facilitate 
a broader dialogue between public policy networks, community 
stakeholders and representatives before, during, and after the 
resource development process.82 This is particularly imperative in 
the onshore resource sector where competition for public resources 
has generated significant conflict, which has been exacerbated by 
structural ambiguities. 
The recent developments in the state of Victoria, Australia, 
provide an interesting case study and are illustrative of the 
difficulties facing a public resource framework with ineffectual 
collaborative governance. In August 2016, the Victorian state 
government announced a permanent ban on all onshore 
unconventional gas development as well as an extension of the 
existing moratorium on conventional onshore gas development 
until 2020.83 A moratorium had been in place since 2012 over all 
conventional and unconventional onshore gas development, 
including all approvals for fracking, exploration, drilling activities 
and the use of chemicals in fracking.84 Moratoriums and bans have 
been utilized in the United States, and whilst many have been long 
lasting, they are provisional in nature, signaling the need for 
substantive change in governance.85 
 
82. This is broadly consistent with what is known as a reflexive law model 
where decision-making processes can involve a range of stakeholders including 
government, industry and civic stakeholders who cooperatively develop and 
implement performance based solutions. See generally Sanford E. Gaines, 
Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. 
L.J. 1 (2003). 
83. Victoria Bans Fracking to Protect Farmers, VICTORIA (Aug. 2016), 
http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victoria-bans-fracking-to-protect-farmers/ [https:// 
perma.cc/QJ5S-FBBJ]. 
84. Id. The ban has was passed and incorporated in legislation in March 
2017. It is now set out in the Mineral Resources Sustainable Development Act 1992 
(Vic) ss 8(A) and 8(D) (Austl.), and the Petroleum Act 1998 (Vic), s 16(A) (Austl.). 
85. See, e.g., Abrahm Lustgarten & Nicholas Kusnetz, New York Passes 
Temporary Ban on Hydraulic Fracturing, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 4, 2010), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/new-york-senate-passes-temporary-ban-on-
hydraulic-fracturing [https://perma.cc/LUG4-XSLB] (discussing the temporary 
moratorium passed in New York banning hydraulic fracturing until May 2011 
with the aim of giving the legislature more time to investigate the associated 
environmental impacts); Joe Smydo, City OKs Ban on Gas Drilling, PITT. POST 
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.uppermon.org/news/Pgh-Alleg/PPG-PGH_ 
Drilling_Ban-17Nov10.html [https://perma.cc/E4T4-BVHV] (discussing the 2010 
ban by the city council of Pittsburgh on natural gas drilling within the city limits). 
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The permanent ban in Victoria followed the findings of an 
inquiry in 2015 into onshore unconventional gas development in 
Victoria.86 These findings indicated a widespread failure by the 
state government to develop effective community engagement 
protocols involving a sufficient cross-section of community 
representatives. The finding also revealed transparency failures 
because communities have not been informed of relevant 
information regarding chemicals and toxins used within hydraulic 
fracturing processes. The non-disclosure of chemicals used in 
hydraulic fracturing processes was found to be commonplace 
within ‘commercial in confidence’ arrangements, a practice that 
was compounded by the absence of any legal obligation mandating 
public disclosure of the types, concentrations or toxicity of any such 
chemicals.87 
The inquiry found that community concern regarding the 
social and environmental impacts of onshore unconventional gas 
was extensive and had not been dispelled. This concern was 
apparent from the broad range of submissions received from a 
cross-section of community stakeholders including farmers and 
other landholders, environmental groups, land-care groups, 
medical professionals, hydro-geologists, tourism operators, small 
business owners, and local councils.88 
For example, the submission received from a community group 
describing themselves as the ‘Gasfield Free Seaspray’ in the Otway 
region, an area renowned for agriculture and tourism, made it 
clear that 98 per cent of those surveyed in the community did not 
want gas fields in the Seaspray community or surrounding areas.89 
Further, it asserted that the community had unilaterally declared 
itself to be ‘gas field free’ on 28 July 2013, despite the absence of 
 
86. PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA: ENV’T & PLANNING COMM., INQUIRY INTO 
ONSHORE UNCONVENTIONAL GAS IN VICTORIA: FINAL REPORT (2015), http://www. 
parliament.vic.gov.au/file_uploads/EPC_58-03_Text_WEB_BYPNWy4W.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/49YR-MSSL] [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. 
87. Id. at 56 
88. See, e.g., id. at app. (listing over 1600 submitters over a six month period); 
id. at 66 (noting that since 2012 over 60 communities in Gippsland and Western 
Victoria declared themselves ‘gas field free’ and formed local action groups); 
Inquiry into Unconventional Gas in Victoria: Submissions, PARLIAMENT OF 
VICTORIA: ENV’T & PLANNING COMM., http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/epc/article  
/2636 [https://perma.cc/QH2P-PR6W]. 
89. PARLIAMENT OF VICTORIA, FINAL REPORT, supra note 86, at 66. 
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any government or industry engagement. The community 
proceeded to mark the occasion with the formation of a human 
sign, comprised of 650 people, spelling out the words ‘No Gas 
Fields.’90 
The eventual imposition by the state government of a 
permanent ban on all onshore unconventional gas development 
amounted to a failure of governance. The absence of cooperative 
measures within the regulatory framework capable of properly 
supporting the integration of deep-rooted community concerns 
over the social and environmental impacts of unconventional gas 
extraction combined with the absence of a clear ownership 
interface between private land ownership and public resource 
ownership were critical issues. The deficiencies generated 
community distrust, anxiety and disengagement. 
Whilst the ban alleviates the immediate environmental 
concerns associated with unconventional gas extraction, it is not a 
solution. The entire purpose of a ban or a moratorium is the 
suspension of private activities in the interests of broader public 
benefit. A ban does not provide resolution and indeed, its presence 
is indicative of deeper social, economic and regulatory concerns 
that require attention.91 The endpoint for a moratorium or ban is 
therefore legal reform. This should include greater cooperative 
governance between state and federal governments within a 
federal framework because working together to achieve 
comprehensive outcomes is the most effective way of addressing 
entrenched social and environmental issues relevant to onshore 
energy development.92 A ban should not act as a subterfuge or 
impediment to the expedient implementation of regulatory 
development that is consistent with progressive public interest 
obligations—otherwise it is regressive. 
 
90. Id. 
91. See Bram Thompson, What Is a Moratorium?, 42 CAN. L. TIMES 761, 762 
(1922) (“[a] [m]oratorium is simply a [l]aw to delay the exercise of some right 
which in the absence of the Moratorium would be in complete operation.”). 
92. See, e.g., Hannah J. Wiseman & Hari M. Osofsky, Regional Energy 
Governance and U.S. Carbon Emissions, 43 ECOLOGY L.Q. 143, 153 (2016) 
(arguing that improving coordination in energy governance depends upon further 
changes being implemented to federalism models). 
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III. SOCIAL OBLIGATION JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Public Trust Doctrine 
The public resource framework in Australia has much to learn 
from the public trust doctrine, which has been so influential in the 
regulation and management of natural resources in the United 
States. The doctrine has been profoundly important because it 
imposes trust obligations upon state governments, and compels 
them to take account of public values when making decisions that 
impact vital natural resources within their ownership domain.93 In 
this respect, the public trust doctrine functions in an anticipatory 
mode,94 because its ultimate objective is to facilitate change in 
social and governmental behavior. Whilst the public trust doctrine 
has been criticized as illegitimately substituting informed 
administrative discretion with informed judicial opinion,95 it 
nevertheless remains a crucially important doctrine in terms of its 
capacity to protect and manage some of the fundamental changes 
occurring within natural resource domains. These changes are vast 
and disruptive and include significant transitional alterations 
connected with the deployment of carbon abatement strategies 
that necessarily include the implementation of onshore renewable 
energy projects and the expansion of conventional and 
unconventional gas production. The changes are a product of 
social, technological and environmental progression and 
necessarily involve expanding public interest assessments. Within 
 
93. See Sax, supra note 14, at 484 (where the author famously argues that 
“certain interests are so intrinsically important to every citizen that their free 
availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens . . . . [T]o protect those 
rights, it is necessary to be especially wary lest any particular individual or group 
acquire the power to control them.”). See generally Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas 
W. Merrill, The Origins of the American Public Trust Doctrine: What Really 
Happened in Illinois Central, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 799 (2004); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Modern Public Trust Principles: Recognizing Rights and Integrating Standards, 
82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (2006); Richard L. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of 
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources Law: Questioning the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631 (1986). 
94. Timothy Patrick Brady, “But Most of it Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:” 
The Public Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. 
L. REV. 621, 631 (1990). 
95. Steven M. Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: 
Ineffective- and Undesirable- Judicial Intervention, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 455, 457 
(1982). 
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this context, the public trust doctrine plays a vital role, monitoring 
the progression of government activities.96 
Historically, the public trust doctrine is a derivation of 
common law and Roman civil law. The Institutes of Justinian 
stated that, in accordance with the law of nature, “these things are 
common to mankind—the air, running water, the sea, and 
consequently the shores of the sea.”97 The public acquired 
usufructuary rights in these common resources through what was 
known as res communis ownership, which the state protected. This 
meant that the public held rights to fish in rivers and ports as well 
as rights of passage and navigation in navigable rivers and the 
sea.98 
The public trust doctrine emerged in the United States in the 
19th century through a series of seminal cases. In these cases, relief 
was granted upon the basis that the state owned all the navigable 
waterways and the land beneath those waterways as a trustee 
under a public trust.99 The trust played an important role in this 
context because it prevented the state from transferring public 
land to private owners so as to preclude the public from the right 
to use the waterways.100 As outlined by the United States Supreme 
Court in Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, where it was held that 
the navigable waters of Lake Michigan, which the State 
Government owned and had alienated for a railroad development, 
were: 
 
96. For example, the ability of the public to engage in commerce is an 
established public interest that the public trust seeks to protect. See Ill. Cent. R.R. 
Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 454 (1892). The application of the public trust to new 
resources of environmental significance was discussed by Jordan M. Ellis, The 
Sky’s the Limit: Applying the Public Trust Doctrine to the Atmosphere, 86 TEMP. 
L. REV. 807, 814 (2014) (noting that “[w]hen considering the reach of the public 
trust doctrine, courts are guided by the present interests and values of society”). 
97. THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN 158.2.1.1 (Thomas Collett Sandars trans., 
1876). 
98. The principle is derived from THE INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN which 
characterizes certain types of property as ‘common to all’; see Patrick Deveney, 
Title, Jus Publicum and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT 
L.J. 13, 23 (1976). 
99. See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 466 (Shiras, J., dissenting). 
100. See Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 413 (1842); Arnold v. 
Mundy, 6 N.J.L 1 (1821). 
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. . .held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have 
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference 
of private parties. . .The trust devolving upon the State for the 
public, and which can only be discharged by the management and 
control of property in which the public has an interest, cannot be 
relinquished by a transfer of the property. The control of the State 
for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to such 
parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, 
or can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the 
public interest in the lands and waters remaining.101 
Subsequent decision applied the public trust principle to other 
areas of natural resource governance and, in 1970, Joseph Sax 
famously argued that the public trust doctrine had the potential to 
apply to a wide range of areas “in which diffuse public interests 
need protection against tightly organized groups with clear and 
immediate goals.”102 Sax argued that the protective focus of the 
public trust gave it great functionality within a large range of 
vulnerable natural resource areas.103 
The primary utility of the doctrine lay in its capacity to ensure 
that the state complied with strict trustee responsibilities when 
managing common resources for the benefit of the public. The 
public holds the beneficial title and can compel the state to comply 
with trustee responsibilities. State Attorney Generals, as trustees, 
may sue for any damages to natural resources held on public trust 
by the state.104 
To establish a claim for damages, a state Attorney General 
must prove that the actions of the state amount to a breach of 
trustee responsibility in that the action constitutes “an 
unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of trust 
rights.”105 In some states natural resource damages may be 
recovered for a breach relevant to any natural resource. In other 
 
101. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452-53. 
102. Sax, supra note 14, at 556. 
103. Id. 
104. Allan Kanner, The Public Trust Doctrine, Parens Patriae, and the 
Attorney General as the Guardian of the State’s Natural Resources, 16 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 57, 59 (2005). 
105. Id. 
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states, however, recovery is restricted to natural resources actually 
owned by the state.106 
The state Attorney-General also has the power to bring a 
parens patriae action, where recovery of natural resource damages 
is sought on the basis of an injury to the sovereign or quasi-
sovereign interests of the state and this includes injury to the 
environment.107 The recent decision of the California Superior 
Court in Environmental Law Foundation, et al. v. State Water 
Resources Control Board, et al. is illustrative of the scope of the 
action. In that case, the court held that the state had a “fiduciary-
like” duty to consider the possible environmental impacts upon 
navigable water following the pumping of nearby groundwater.108 
The applicants argued that the depletion of groundwater decreased 
flows in the river because the river was hydrologically connected to 
the groundwater systems. This, in turn, harmed river fish 
populations and had a deleterious effect upon navigability. The 
court held that the diversion of groundwater was, in the 
circumstances, harmful to public interests that were explicitly 
protected by the public trust doctrine and this could generate 
natural resource damages.109 
 
106. Id. at 59 (citing State by Stuart v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59 
(N.D. 1972); Commonwealth v. Agway Inc., 232 A.2d 69 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). 
Both cases were referred to by EDWARD H. P. BRANS, LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE TO 
PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES 53 (2001), explaining that the courts in both cases 
held that state claims for natural resource damages due to loss of fish could not 
succeed because the state did not own the fish). 
107. See id. at 59; see also Carter H. Strickland, Jr., The Scope of Authority 
of Natural Resource Trustees, 20 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 301, 318 (1995); Michael 
McGrath, The Role of State Attorneys General in National Environmental Policy, 
30 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 449, 451 (2005) (noting the strong common law 
responsibility of the state attorney-generals under the public trust doctrine to 
protect natural resources within state boundaries). 
108. Envtl. Law Found. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 2014 WL 8843074, 
at 6 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. July 15, 2014); see also Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. 
Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 728 (Cal. 1983) (where it was held that the public 
trust doctrine bestows on the state a positive duty to consider the impact of 
government action on public trust resources. In practical terms this means that 
the state must try to minimize or avoid harm to interests protected by the public 
trust.). 
109. See Envtl. Law Found., 2014 WL 8843074 at 8. This principle provides 
governmental agencies enforcing the Sustainable Groundwater Management Act 
a defense against a takings claim. See also Adam Bowling & Elizabeth Vissers, 
The Public Trust Doctrine and its Groundwater Application in California, 18 U. 
DENV. WATER L. REV. 468 (2015). 
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The public trust doctrine has been articulated as a state 
doctrine given its application to state owned natural resource 
interests. In Alec L v. Jackson, the district court dismissed a claim 
by six federal agencies which had allegedly violated their fiduciary 
duty to preserve and protect the atmosphere as a commonly shared 
public trust in accordance with the public trust doctrine.110 The 
court held that the public trust doctrine was a matter of state 
rather than federal law and consequently the court did not have 
jurisdiction.111 Further, even if the public trust doctrine did apply 
to federal constitutional law, the provisions of the Clean Air Act 
displaced it.112 This was the explicit conclusion of the Supreme 
Court in American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, where it was 
held that the environmental protection actions authorized by the 
Clean Air Act precluded any federal common law right to seek 
abatement of carbon dioxide emissions from carbon intensive 
power plants.113 
The non-application of the public trust doctrine to federal 
agencies was recently revisited by the district court in Kelsey 
Cascade Rose Julianana et al v. United States of America where 
Judge Coffin indicated a preparedness to entertain a federal action 
grounded in public trust principles.114 In that case, the plaintiffs 
included a group of young people, aged 19 years or younger as well 
as activist associations who argued they were beneficiaries of a 
federal public trust which had been breached because they had 
been harmed by government action and inaction in generating 
carbon pollution and allowing fossil fuel exploitation.115 The 
plaintiffs argued that the approval and promotion of fossil fuel 
development, including exploration, extraction, production, 
 
110. Alec L. v. Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012), aff'd sub nom. Alec 
L. ex rel. Loorz v. McCarthy, 561 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
111. Id. at 15 (where District Judge Wilkins concluded that the plaintiffs 
have not raised a federal question to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction under 
§ 1331). 
112. Id. at 16; see also the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (2012). The 
act was first enacted in 1970 and was substantially amended in 1990. Evolution 
of the Clean Air Act, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/evolution-
clean-air-act [https://perma.cc/Y2P5-NEM9] (last updated Jan. 3, 2017). 
113. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011). 
114. Juliana v. United States, No. 6:15-CV-1517-TC, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
52940 (D. Or. 2016). 
115. Id. at *4. 
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transportation, importation, exportation and combustion resulted 
in violations their fundamental constitutional rights to be free 
from government actions that harm life, liberty and property.116 
The defendant argued that the public trust doctrine is a 
matter of state law and does not depend upon Federal 
Constitutional law.117 Judge Coffin disagreed, holding that there 
were constitutional parameters connected with the emission of 
greenhouse gases from fossil fuel exploitation.118 He argued that: 
. . .the intractability of the debates before Congress and state leg-
islatures and the alleged valuing of short-term economic interest 
despite the cost to human life, necessitates a need for the courts to 
evaluate the constitutional parameters of the action or inaction 
taken by the government. This is especially true when such harms 
have an alleged disparate impact on a discrete class of society.119 
He concluded that: 
When combined with the EPA’s duty to protect the public health 
from airborne pollutants and the government’s public trust duties 
deeply ingrained in this country’s history, the allegations in the 
complaint state, for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a substan-
tive due process claim.120 
These cases reveal a deep-rooted consciousness of the 
overarching relevance of the public trust doctrine in United States 
constitutional jurisprudence.121 This has imbued the public trust 
doctrine with a blend of both common law and constitutional 
elements.122 The explicit obligation imposed on the government by 
the public trust, to protect natural resources within its domain, 
includes protection against the impact of onshore resource 
development as well as protection against the broader impacts of 
 
116. Id. at *5-8. 
117. Id. at *25-28. 
118. Id. at *16. 
119. Id. at *17. 
120. Id. at *39-40. 
121. Id. 
122. See Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some 
Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 
(1989). 
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the climate change crisis.123 This is because the public interest 
responsibilities of the state government are encapsulated within 
an explicit duty of loyalty that is owed towards the public 
beneficiaries of the trust, to act in their interests when making 
decisions that affect natural resources. The breadth of the public 
trust doctrine in the United States has also encouraged significant 
legislative developments, at both the state and federal level, in 
areas that include environmental protection and natural resource 
management.124 
In Australia, there has been resistance to any application of 
the public trust doctrine despite its clear utility within a public 
resource framework.125 There have been a number of reported 
instances where the courts have drawn upon the language of the 
public trust doctrine to illustrate, largely in a metaphorical sense, 
the special responsibilities of the state towards the public 
resources it owns or controls, however no formal adoption has 
occurred.126 
 
123. Courtney Lords, Protection of Public Trust Assets: Trustees’ Duty of 
Loyalty in the Context of Modern American Politics, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 519, 
524 (2008) (noting that the sovereign trustees must act to defend the trust against 
injury, and this duty links the doctrine to the climate change crisis). 
124. It has been argued that the implementation of this legislation has 
resulted in the public trust doctrine having outlived its utility. See Lazarus, supra 
note 93, at 633 (arguing that trends in legislative development indicate that the 
public trust doctrine lacks the utility it previously had and it now “obscures 
analysis and renders more difficult the important process of reworking natural 
resources law”). 
125. The prospect of applying the public trust in Australia was examined by 
Tim Bonyhady, A Usable Past: The Public Trust in Australia, 12 ENVTL. & PLAN. 
L.J. 329 (1995); P. Stein, Ethical Issues in Land-use Planning and the Public 
Trust, 12 ENVTL. & PLAN. L.J 13, 593-601 (1996) (the author argued that the 
whilst the public trust has had little influence on the evolution of environmental 
law in Australia, two nineteenth century cases reveal that the trust is 
nevertheless deeply embedded in Australian law). See also Tim Bonyhady, An 
Australian Public Trust, in ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY AND POLICY: STILL SETTLING 
AUSTRALIA 258-72 (Stephen Dovers, ed., 2000); GERRY BATES, ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW IN AUSTRALIA 41-43 (LexisNexis Butterworths, 7th ed. 2010). 
126. See, e.g., Willoughby City Council v Minister for the Env’t (1989) 78 
LGERA 19, 34 (Austl.) (noting that “[N]ational parks are held by the State in trust 
for the enjoyment and benefit of its citizens, including future generations”). A 
public trust argument was raised in Upper Mooki Landcare Inc v Shenhua 
Watermark Coal Pty Ltd & Minister for Planning (2016) NSWLEC 6, 152 (Austl.), 
where the applicant argued that the principles of ecological sustainable 
development are informed by the public trust, however the argument was rejected 
on the grounds that a duty to consider an application “affirmatively, 
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This is unfortunate given the clear value such a doctrine would 
bring to an ownership framework where public interest is crucial 
because sub-surface resources have been vested in the state. Two 
primary reasons have been put forward for its rejection. In the first 
place, it has been argued that the existence of the public trust may 
interfere with the sovereign powers of the Crown as the ultimate 
owner of all land within a feudal hierarchy. As a trustee under a 
public trust, the state must act in the interests of the public and it 
has been suggested that the application of such a rigorous fiduciary 
obligation may conflict with the effective exercise of sovereign 
constitutional power.127 Secondly, it has been argued that the 
fiduciary responsibilities generated by the public trust are 
inconsistent with statutory powers and therefore interfere with the 
robust adaptability of established judicial review principles.128 
These objections are increasingly difficult to justify within a 
changing onshore resource context. It has been suggested that any 
application of the public trust principle within Australia would 
require a fundamental “reconceptualization of the importance of 
such rights in our jurisprudence. . .”129 The dramatic changes to 
the onshore energy landscape arguably justify such revision 
because the rights of the public, as the ultimate beneficiaries of 
natural resources, require strong, institutional protection. It is 
crucial to ensure that the state exercises power over vested natural 
resources in accordance with strict public interest responsibilities. 
Monitoring the shifting and somewhat amorphous nature of these 
public responsibilities would be more appropriately conduct 
through the application of equitable responsibilities under a trust 
 
fundamentally and properly” effectively amounted to a merits review rather than 
a judicial review. 
127. See Tito v. Waddell (No. 2) [1977] 3 All ER 129 (Eng.) (where the court 
argued that the Crown had acted in breach of trust and fiduciary obligations owed 
to them regarding phosphate mining royalties that had been paid into ‘trust 
funds’ for the indigenous communities. Megarry V-C held that this created not a 
true trust but rather a ‘higher form’ trust because it involved a relationship with 
the Crown. The ‘higher form’ trust was more an emanation of governmental 
obligation than specific fiduciary responsibility.). For further discussion, see 
Stephen Gray, Holding the Government to Account: The ‘Stolen Wages’ Issue, 
Fiduciary Duty and Trust Law, 32 MELB. U.L.R. 115 (2008). 
128. See Paul Finn, Public Trusts, Public Fiduciaries, 38 FED. L. REV. 335, 
340 (2010) (the author argues that judicial review operates in a distinct manner 
to the discretionary dimensions of the fiduciary power). 
129. Id. at 345. 
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mechanism. Indeed, the overriding importance of the public trust 
doctrine has already been recognized in the context of coastal 
waters, where the threat of coastal recession due to extreme 
weather events and sea level rises has prompted calls for its 
prompt implementation.130 
The equitable duties of the government, as public trustee, 
ensure consideration is given to the interests of the public as a 
whole, because the public is the ultimate owner. The significance 
of the public trust, like the private trust, lies in the fact that the 
ownership held by the trustee is not absolute. Trustees must look 
after the trust assets vested within them so that they are protected 
against loss and so that the interests of existing and future 
beneficiaries are managed. The duty of loyalty also requires 
governments to communicate and disclose to public beneficiaries 
all relevant information regarding natural resource management 
and exploitation.131 Strong transparency and accountability 
requirements are consistent with the emerging importance of 
community engagement protocols.132 The public trust doctrine 
would require all documents connected to decisions made 
regarding public resources to be publicly accessible. All such 
documents are trust documents but it would not include 
information relevant to the exercise of administrative discretion. 
This is consistent with the private law principle that information 
relevant to the exercise of discretion is not a trust document.133 
The obligation to communicate and disclose would significantly 
enhance the capacity of the state to satisfy public interest 
 
130. See generally Bruce Thom, Climate Change, Coastal Hazards and the 
Public Trust Doctrine, 8 MACQUARIE J. INT’L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 21 (2012). 
131. Cf. 76 AM. JUR. 2D Trusts § 356 (2005). 
132. The constitutional framework in Australia imposes a system of 
representative government however the pattern of governmental organizations 
which it ordains has resulted in the creation of power relationships, institutional 
arrangements and practices and policy processes which have made the Australian 
public vulnerable. See the discussion by P. Finn, Public Trust and Public 
Accountability, 3 GRIFFITH L. REV. 224, 227 (1994). 
133. In re Londonderry’s Settlement, [1964] 3 All ER 6 (Eng.); see Marigold 
Pty Ltd v Belswan (Mandurah) Pty Ltd (2001) 209 WASC 23 (Austl.) (“[T]he right 
of a beneficiary to inspect trust documents, whether founded on proprietary right 
or fiduciary duty is not unqualified. Confidentiality or privilege are circumstances 
in which a discretion to refuse inspection may arise.”). 
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obligations towards communities impacted by resource 
development.134 
Further, where trust principles are breached, there is 
significant scope for awarding relief. The state, as public trustee, 
would act to defend the trust assets against injury and, where 
damage occurs, the state would be obliged to restore the trust 
assets.135 The availability and scope of relief for the breach of a 
public trust duty would provide a stronger incentive for a broader 
and more rigorous protection of vested natural resource assets by 
the state as well as stronger adherence to community engagement 
processes. 
The public trust doctrine is an important transitional tool 
because of its ability to provide institutional guidance and stability 
as it actively seeks to protect reasonable expectations in the 
relative stability of relationships from the destabilizing effects of 
change.136 The integration of the public trust principle into 
Australian jurisprudence would provide members of the public, as 
beneficiaries under a broader public trust, with improved rights of 
communication and disclosure. It would improve the capacity of 
localized residents and stakeholders to engage in governmental 
decisions regarding public trust assets that affect the community. 
In this respect, adopting the public trust doctrine would facilitate 
greater adherence to collaborative government norms. This would 
be a constructive and positive development given the capacity of 
state decisions to affect ecologies, biodiversity, climate change, food 
security and at a macro level, principles of intergenerational 
equity.137 
 
134. See generally Chris Ballard & Glen Banks, Resource Wars: The 
Anthropology of Mining, 32 ANN. REV. ANTHROPOLOGY 287 (2003) (the authors 
discuss the different forms of community engagement that have emerged within 
mining communities in Australia). 
135. See generally Mary Christina Wood, Nature’s Trust: Reclaiming an 
Environmental Discourse, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 243 (2007). 
136. See Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its 
Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 186-88 (1980). 
137. In the United States, courts have applied the public trust doctrine to 
ensure, for example, the protection of public lands for climate change benefits and 
the promotion of international principles of ecological sustainability. See generally 
Paul A. Barresi, Mobilizing the Public Trust Doctrine in Support of Publicly 
Owned Forests as Carbon Dioxide Sinks in India and the United States, 23 COLO. 
J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 39 (2012). 
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B. Land Ethics and the Doctrine of Propriety 
Land ethics may be described as a set of normative connections 
that humans make when interacting with the land.138 These 
normative connections seek to delineate ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ ways of 
living on the land.139 In this way, land ethics are interconnected 
with the ownership of land because they embody the concept of 
property as ‘propriety.’ Propriety has an established 
jurisprudential background.140 Conceptually, it stems from the 
assumption that ownership is directly connected to social order 
because it functions as a private entitlement that promotes public 
good.141 
Proprietarians generally assume that ‘public good’ has some 
sort of comprehensible substantive denotation, despite its 
conceptualization proving to be somewhat elusive. Public good is 
not generally synonymous with the commodification of property 
because market-oriented perspectives often obscure social welfare 
values that seek to prevent behaviour that endangers the 
livelihood of the communities in which owners reside.142 Hence, 
 
138. See ALDO LEOPOLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC: AND SKETCHES HERE AND 
THERE 201 (1949) (where the term ‘land ethics’ was first used in this essay as an 
organizing concept). For subsequent evaluation of this, see Eric Freyfogle, The 
Land Ethic and Pilgrim Leopold, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 217 (1990) (where the 
author argues that property is in ‘metamorphosis not decline’ and this shift is, in 
part, attributable to its changing relationship with the natural environment). 
139. For an interesting discussion on the connection between resource titles 
and community norms, see Fred P. Bosselman, Four Land Ethics: Order, Reform, 
Responsibility, Opportunity, 24 ENVTL. L. 1439 (1994). 
140. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-
1960, at 110-11 (1977); Richard F. Babcock & Duane A. Feurer, Land as a 
Commodity ‘Affected with a Public Interest’, 52 WASH. L. REV. 289 (1977); C. 
Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 
U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986); Donald W. Large, This Land is Whose Land? Changing 
Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 WIS. L. REV. 1039 (1973). 
141. See RICHARD BARNES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES (2009) 
(noting that the proprietarian perspective forces one to realize that property 
indeed has a central role in ordering society and shaping social relations). 
142. See Joseph William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of 
Property: Castles, Investments and Just Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 309, 
330 (2006) (proposing a ‘citizenship model’ of ownership which seeks to confer 
freedom and equality on all persons, and simultaneously places owners in the role 
of guardians of social order). 
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proprietarians would subordinate economic imperatives wherever 
they are found to conflict with or threaten the social good.143 
Fundamentally, proprietarianism examines the role that 
property systems play in shaping community and social order.144 
Owning land or natural resources necessarily involves taking 
responsibility for the management and control of that land or 
natural resource.145 Owners with a greater community values 
instead of individuals voicing particularized entitlement 
concerns.146 This connects with our shared perception of the 
stewardship responsibilities held by all land and natural resource 
owners who are taking care of a vital public resource rather than 
controlling it.147 Land ethics foster a greater awareness and 
appreciation of the collective nature of environmental and 
 
143. Gregory S. Alexander, Property as Propriety, 77 NEB. L. REV. 667, 668 
(1998). 
144. See Alexander, supra note 54 (especially Part 1, The Civic Republican 
Culture 1776-1800, where Alexander traces the connection between property and 
social order within the civic republican era). 
145. Eric T. Freyfogle, Ownership and Ecology, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1269, 
1295-97 (1993) (outlining the importance of land-owner responsibilities, which 
include caring for and managing natural resources, in an environment where 
sustainable living is a goal. The author goes on to suggest that: “by now we must 
know that the land does not belong to us. We belong to it. Our charge is to avoid 
injury to this enlarged community and if we can go further, to foster its health 
and beauty.”). 
146. See Eric T. Freyfogle, Property and Liberty, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 75, 
87 (2010) (questioning whether we should continue to allow landowners 
collectively to make decisions about the shared use of their interconnected land 
or whether we force them to act alone and render indefeasible a public or collective 
vision of development); see also Jedediah Purdy, A Freedom Promoting Approach 
to Property: A Renewed Tradition for New Debates, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1237 (2005) 
(arguing that property law needs to be structured by a more refined 
understanding of the meaning of liberty). See generally FRITJOF CAPRA & UGO 
MATTEI, THE ECOLOGY OF LAW: TOWARD A LEGAL SYSTEM IN TUNE WITH NATURE 
AND THE COMMUNITY (2015), http://site.ebrary.com/lib/pacelibrary/reader.action? 
docID=11121699&ppg=2 [https://perma.cc/E9D2-X656] (arguing that a new eco-
legal order has three strategic objectives: (i) to disconnect law from power and 
violence (the nation-state); (ii) to make communities sovereign; and (iii) to make 
ownership generative). 
147. See Alexander, supra note 51, at 1857-58 (distinguishing between 
‘exclusion property’ where one owner has full control over the asset and 
enforceable rights are in rem in character, and ‘governance property,’ which are 
regulated by wide-ranging internal governance norms including cooperation, 
engagement and broader norms that contribute to the development of human 
flourishing). 
34https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2017] PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 413 
sustainability concerns.148 All public and private land and natural 
resources should be subjected to internal governance norms that 
more effectively promote community engagement and mutual 
cooperation. The core objective of a public resource system is for 
the state to nurture macro dispositions of cooperation and in so 
doing minimize interface collisions and satisfy public interest 
duties.149 
Integrating land ethics into the public resource framework will 
also counter-balance the structural monism of ownership regimes 
defined by the right to exclude. If one value system becomes 
definitive of the entire normative framework, it necessarily 
inhibits a greater understanding of differing value perspectives.150 
Cooperative norms have a centrifugal focus. They are directed 
away from the exclusionary core because they compel multi-
dimensional perspectives.151 The heuristic process of 
understanding and responding to community concerns requires 
stronger ethical assimilation to ensure that the state and the 
private owner exercise ownership entitlements in consonance with 
broader public interest and social welfare imperatives. 
IV. SOCIAL LICENSING OBLIGATIONS 
A. Formative Concepts 
The importance of community engagement and 
communitarian values for onshore resource development is clearly 
 
148. See Anna di Robilant, The Virtues of Common Ownership, 91 B.U. L. 
REV. 1359, 1360 (2011) (arguing that properly designed, common ownership 
‘forms’ can achieve a variety of policy goals that individualistic frameworks and 
rights cannot and that this facilitates more cooperative and active communities). 
149. Alexander, supra note 51, at 1884. 
150. Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1416 (2012) (arguing that sharing and cooperation within 
existing ownership principles are a constitutive feature of the property institution 
and concerns about insider’s governance may be as or even more important than 
concerns regarding outsiders’ exclusion). 
151. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1849, 1851-52 (2007) (arguing that norms operating beyond 
the exclusion focus are refinements to the ‘core exclusionary regime’ of property); 
Dagan, supra note 150, at 1419 n.38 (arguing that the conceptualization of 
property as exclusion by Merrill and Smith amounts to “one of the most influential 
accounts of structural monism”). 
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apparent from the rise of what has become known as the social 
license to operate. The social license to operate was a phrase 
initially referenced at a 1997 World Bank meeting for the purposes 
of mining and extractive industries. Community approval 
processes have had a particular resonance in these contexts 
because of the significant impact extractive industries have upon 
the local environment in which they operate. This makes 
improving transparency and gaining the support of affected 
communities crucial.152 The same logic is applicable to all onshore 
energy projects. Expanding resource development into new areas 
traditionally associated with agriculture has created strong 
environmental and social concerns that directly impact upon the 
quality and livelihood of local communities 
The social license to operate eludes precise definition, as it is, 
in essence, a risk management strategy that has a particular 
cogency in circumstances where public unease about industry 
practices is strong. The fact that society is, in general, becoming 
more attuned to the impact of resource development, particularly 
those projects involving the extraction of fossil fuels, upon the 
environment, the atmosphere and the landscape, means that 
industry has had to become more adept at responding to the needs, 
expectations and concerns of community stakeholders. This is 
especially true in the context of onshore resource projects, which 
are amenable to post-normal technologies, such that the impact 
upon the landscape, the environmental and the community is often 
unclear.153 
The social license to operate is therefore a goal oriented, 
negotiated tool utilized by industry to promote information 
transparency and accountability and encourage community 
 
152. See N.Z. SUSTAINABLE BUS. COUNCIL, SOCIAL LICENCE TO OPERATE 4 
(2013), https://www.sbc.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/99437/Social-Licence-
to-Operate-Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/MN7B-WLUC] (noting that the ‘social 
licence’ terminology is now widely used in many sectors including” agriculture, 
energy, manufacturing, mining, pharmaceutical, transport, telecommunications 
and tourism). 
153. See J. RAVETZ & S. FUNTOWICZ, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOLOGICAL 
ECONOMICS: POST-NORMAL SCIENCE 1 (2003), http://leopold.asu.edu/sustainability/ 
sites/default/files/Norton,%20Post%20Normal%20Science,%20Funtowicz_1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DY67-LNTL] (discussing the post-normal science explaining 
that it characterizes a methodology of inquiry that is appropriate for cases where 
“facts are uncertain, values in dispute, stakes high and decisions urgent”). 
36https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2017] PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 415 
acceptance and involvement. The primary aim is to generate 
strong community approval so as to minimize disruption. Gaining 
approval is a multi-dimensional process that depends upon 
voluntary acts of communication and disclosure surpass formal 
legal processes. The assumption is that such will promote 
community confidence because industry appears to be acting in a 
‘legitimate, transparent and socially acceptable manner.’154 
The rise in importance of the social license reveals the growing 
importance of community engagement and risk management 
protocols in the onshore resource sector.155 The social license now 
has cogency within a range of different corporate areas 
highlighting a growing preference for governance informed by the 
input of impacted civil communities.156 It is legitimate to expect 
that those most affected by the impacts of expanding resource 
development should have the most to say about whether or not that 
development should proceed.157 Social licensing is critical to the 
progression of a sustainability paradigm for land and natural 
resources because it optimizes the capacity of the community as a 
whole to protect and preserve nature’s capital.158 
B. Social Licensing and Corporate Strategy 
There are some excellent examples of social licencing 
processes that have achieved strong social welfare and community 
engagement outcomes and in doing so, shifted corporate strategic 
focus. One such example lies with Rio Tinto, a mining company 
 
154. See Neil Gunningham, Robert A. Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Social 
License and Environmental Protection: Why Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 
29 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004). 
155. See generally Austin Shaffer, Skylar Zilliox, & Jessica Smith, 
Memoranda of Understanding and the Social Licence to Operate in Colorado's 
Unconventional Energy Industry: A Study of Citizen Complaints, 35 J. ENERGY & 
NAT. RESOURCES L. 69 (2017). 
156. Ian Thomson, Understanding and Managing Public Reaction to 
‘Fracking’, 33 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 266 (2015). 
157. See Jason Prno & D. Scott Slocombe, Exploring the Origins of ‘Social 
License to Operate’ in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and 
Sustainability Theories, 37 RESOURCES POL’Y 346 (2012). 
158. Claire Richert, Abbie Rogers & Michael Burton, Measuring the Extent 
of a Social License to Operate: The Influence of Marine Biodiversity Offsets in the 
Oil and Gas Sector in Western Australia, 43 RESOURCES POL’Y 121, 122 (2015); see 
also Smith & Richards, supra note 25, at 100. 
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increasingly cognizant of the impact of the mining and natural 
resource sector upon the health, environment and safety of 
impacted, local communities. Rio Tinto has actively sought to 
improve their relationship with community stakeholders by 
ensuring, in accordance with the articulated United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals, that every project has a localized 
and publically reportable set of social performance indicators.159 
These indicators demonstrate the economic contribution of the 
project to the communities and the regions in which they operate 
and include compliance with any negotiated local employment 
targets.160 They also reveal the level of engagement of the company 
with communities via jointly operated community programs and 
strategic outreach facilities.161 
For example, according to its annual report, in 2012 Rio Tinto 
contributed US$292 million to over 2,700 socio-economic 
programmes covering activities such as health, education, business 
development, environmental protection, housing and agricultural 
development.162 Rio Tinto were the largest private sector employer 
of indigenous Australians and they actively sought to form 
partnerships with universities, NGOs and industry to facilitate 
research into global environmental and natural resource concerns 
including biodiversity loss, climate change, water depletion and 
contamination, environmental justice and corruption.163 
The current strategic objective of Rio Tinto is to consistently 
review, reassess and reframe their approach to ensure the material 
 
159. See DEP’T OF ECON. & SOCIAL AFF. OF THE U.N. SECRETARIAT, 
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS REPORT, (2015), http://www.un.org/millennium 
goals/2015_MDG_Report/pdf/MDG%202015%20rev%20%28July%201%29.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/U4JR-D66N]; see also Sustainable Development 2012, 
Engagement, RIOTINTO, http://www.riotinto.com/sustainabledevelopment2012/ 
governance/engagement.html [https://perma.cc/P964-UFCU]. 
160. See RIOTINTO, OUR APPROACH TO COMMUNITIES AND SOCIAL 
PERFORMANCE (2012), http://www.riotinto.com/documents/RT_Rio_Tintos_appro 
ach_to_communities_and_social_performance.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4Z3-NN 
DZ]. This policy includes the objective of establishing local targets and 
performance indicators on the basis of our social and economic knowledge base, 
informed analysis and community engagement. 
161. Id. 
162. See Annual Report 2012 - Key Performance Indicators, RIOTINTO, 
http://www.riotinto.com/annualreport2012/overview/key_performance_indicators
.html [https://perma.cc/B2XD-Q9PV]. 
163. Id. 
38https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
  
2017] PUBLIC RESOURCE OWNERSHIP 417 
risks and concerns relevant to community stakeholders are 
addressed and risk management is optimized.164 Community 
engagement is a strong focus in this strategic plan. One 
particularly successful example of this shift in strategic focus has 
been in Michigan where, in addition to the environmental 
oversight of state regulatory processes, an independent community 
environmental monitoring program has been established at the 
Eagle Mine at Humboldt Mill in order to examine the 
environmental effects of a nickel and copper mine.165 Monitoring 
focuses on groundwater and surface water resources, air quality, 
flora and fauna.166 The community monitoring program, known as 
the Superior Watershed Partnership, implements the community 
monitoring program in collaboration with universities, contractors 
and EPA approved laboratories.167 The project, which has been 
well received, has involved the establishment of an oversight board 
with representation from the community, the environmental 
sector, the mining sector as well as the local indigenous population, 
the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community.168 Community forums 
have been held in a wide number of regions including: Marquette, 
Big Bay, Humboldt and Michigamee and the discussion has 
included not only existing and potential impacts but also future 
proposals for monitoring improvement.169 
 
164. RIOTINTO, 2016 STRATEGIC REPORT 29 (2016), http://www.riotinto.com/ 
documents/RT_2016_Strategic_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/932V-QLMA] (‘To 
support our Communities and Social Performance target for 2016-2020, sites 
began collecting data relating to the effective capture and management of 
community complaints. All sites are required to have a complaints, disputes and 
grievance mechanism in place in line with the effectiveness criteria for 
operational-level grievance mechanisms.”).   
165. Community Environmental Monitoring of the Rio Tinto Eagle Mine, 
RIOTINTO (2012), http://swpcemp.org/wp-content/themes/cemp/pdfs/CEMP-Diag 
ram.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH65-VCB3] [hereinafter Community Environmental 
Monitoring Diagram].  
166. Id. 
167. Mine Monitoring, SUPERIOR WATERSHED P’SHIP & LAND TRUST, http:// 
swpcemp.org/monitoring/mine-monitoring [https://perma.cc/R9X9-RVD9]. 
168. Community Environmental Monitoring Diagram, supra note 165, 
(discussing the framework for the program). 
169. See SUPERIOR WATERSHED P’SHIP, 2016 WORK PLAN FOR THE COMMUNITY 
ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING PROGRAM OF THE EAGLE MINE 7 (2016), http:// 
swpcemp.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/CEMP-2016-Work-Plan_062016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WU79-TXFP]. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Ownership in land and natural resources invariably results in 
the destruction or diminution of our human habitat.170 This is 
because humans are fated to live on the planet and this means that 
the pattern of land and resource entitlements adopted is critical to 
social organization and progression. As Joseph Sax has stated, 
“habitat inheres in land.”171 Our imaginative and moral 
investment in our landscape and our community has always 
surpassed its pure functionality as an ownership commodity.172 
Despite this, deeply ingrained assumptions about rights to 
exclusivity and autonomy endure.173 Private and public land and 
resource owners have come to expect that, within their boundaries 
and subject to negative externalities, they will be immunized 
against state coercion or obligation.174 In the words of Carol Rose, 
“[t]he property owner has a small domain of complete mastery, 
complete self-direction, and complete protection from the whims of 
others.”175 This stems from the libertarian belief that, in the 
absence of harm, non-intervention should be the “presumptive 
 
170. See Lynda L. Butler, The Resilience of Property, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 847, 
858 (2013) (noting that the interests of neighbouring landowners in the ecosystem 
are not protected under traditional common law and public right theories do not 
provide sufficient justification for uncompensated regulation of private property 
to preserve critical environmental resources). 
171. Sax, supra note 79, at 10 (arguing that the social relevance of land is 
connected to its articulation as a ‘habitat’ which allows it to be conceived as a 
component of the natural economy). 
172. See JEDEDIAH PURDY, THE MEANING OF PROPERTY, FREEDOM COMMUNITY 
AND THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 1-5 (2010) (discussing the economic rationalization 
of property as a response to limited resources); see also Carol M. Rose, 
Privatization: The Road to Democracy?, 33-34 (Yale Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 106, 2006) (arguing that property is a legal 
relationship that stimulates our imagination). 
173. ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND 
ON THE OWNERSHIP OF LAND (2007); see also Sax, supra note 79, at 2. 
174. In Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013), Justice Kagan concluded 
in her comments that “[t]he law of property ‘naturally enough influences’ our 
‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be free from governmental 
incursions” (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (2006)) (referenced 
by Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 643, 
701 n.359 (2014)). 
175. Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety, 108 
YALE L. J. 601, 604 (1998). 
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posture of the state.”176 Ownership therefore confers a legal and 
political sphere where individuals are free to exercise preference 
without governmental or external coercion. 
These entrenched attitudes have created profound relational 
divisions between the individual, the state and the community.177 
They have also impeded the capacity of the state, within a public 
resource sector, to comply with its public interest mandate.178 
Social contract theorists such as Hobbes support autonomous 
ownership, arguing that private ownership is a benefit flowing 
from the conferral of individual authority to the state.179 
Ownership autonomy therefore represents the material foundation 
for social order as it maximizes preference satisfaction and makes 
resources more valuable.180 Similarly, Locke argued that this 
implicit social contract, which exists as an idea of reason rather 
than an assumption of fact, justifies the powers of the modern state 
and forms the foundation of our social and legal order.181 
These private law assumptions have, however, been 
consistently challenged. Rousseau argued that the act of 
ownership and the capacity of an individual to distinguish and 
assert exclusivity and control split the self from the world.182 
Hence, autonomy removes the individual from the primary human 
condition connecting them to nature as a whole. Thus humanity is 
undone “if you forget that the fruits of the earth belong to all and 
 
176. See Jennifer S. Hendricks, Renegotiating the Social Contract, 110 MICH. 
L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2012). 
177. Alexander, supra note 143. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 54. 
178. See Melissa K. Scanlan, Implementing the Public Trust Doctrine: A 
Lakeside View into the Trustee's World, 39 ECOLOGY L.Q. 123, 176 (2012) (the 
author discusses the legitimacy concerns that exist where public interest 
considerations are influenced by private interests); Huffman, supra note 7, at 53 
(noting that the history of public resource management is one of private interests 
seeking benefits from public land resources.). 
179. See generally JOHN RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999). 
180. See CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 58, 62 (1994) (describing 
the medieval and view of property as "propriety," because ownership carried social 
and political responsibilities). 
181. See IMMANUEL KANT, On the Common Saying: This May Be True in 
Theory But it Does Not Apply in Practice, in KANT’S POLITICAL WRITING 61 (Han 
Reiss ed., 1970); see also Jeremy Waldron, Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism, 
37 PHIL. Q. 127, 127 (1987). 
182. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INEQUALITY 
(Paul Negri & Greg Boroson eds., 2004) (1754). 
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the earth to no one!”.183 Ownership autonomy means that land and 
natural resources are treated as a fungible commodity, disengaged 
from their social and ecological communities. 
Public resource ownership is not subject to the same level of 
autonomy as private resource ownership because it is moderated 
by public interest responsibilities. It is not amenable to the 
contractarian rationales that underlie private ownership 
entitlements. Hence, the state must ensure that all autonomous 
entitlements in public resources are managed in accordance with 
communitarian responsibilities.184 Public resource ownership is 
increasingly defined not by the capacity to exclude and control but 
rather, by the right to harness social and community approval. 
These rights reflect a growing differentiation between private and 
public resource ownership. The growing importance of community 
involvement within public resource development highlights our 
evolving appreciation of ownership as a product of human 
communities with a relational focus that is both “human-regarding 
and object-regarding.”185 
Public resource frameworks need to facilitate assessment 
processes for onshore resource development that cohere with the 
underlying philosophy of the ownership structure. State ownership 
in natural resources is only justifiable if the state is appropriately 
connected with the concerns of the community and is therefore 
equipped to evaluate the interests and priorities of intersecting 
interests. Autonomous ownership entitlements in public resources 
must be exercised in accordance with the ‘calculus of social 
interests’ via an evaluation process that integrates the needs, 
expectations and interests of impacted communities. 
Community is of course a dynamic concept. Communities 
change and evolve over time meaning that public interest 
assessments require readjustment. The norms and values that 
existed when the public resource framework was first introduced 
in Australia are no longer reflective of current attitudes. Social, 
 
183. Id. at 24. 
184. See Edward L. Rubin, The Illusion of Property as a Right and its Reality 
as an Imperfect Alternative, 2 WIS. L. REV. 573 (2013) (arguing that the role of 
property in modern society has evolved into a more communitarian notion). 
185. Craig A. Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of 
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 332 (2002). 
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environmental and community perspectives have progressed and 
public interest protocols must reflect this. 
In the current energy landscape communities need to be 
properly and transparently informed about the scope and impact 
of onshore resource development. This is particularly imperative 
in a public resource framework where, in the absence of a public 
trust doctrine, neither the public interest responsibilities of the 
state nor the boundaries between state and private ownership 
domains are clearly defined 
Community representatives must be given the opportunity to 
provide feedback and to engage with government and industry 
during the assessment and approval process. The state must 
actively satisfy itself that any proposed resource development is 
consistent with the needs of the impacted community. This must 
be a collaborative assessment process where the community is 
informed and has the opportunity to respond. Community 
engagement needs to be implemented at every stage of a resource 
development project to ensure it is effective. This should include 
feedback in the initial proposal and assessment, community 
representation in all private access negotiations and community 
involvement in all cumulative environmental monitoring, 
management and rehabilitation programs. 
Promoting a comprehensive and structured approach to 
community engagement ensures that the public most affected by 
the development is also the public most intricately involved in its 
progression. Community values have always been inextricably 
connected to the public resource ownership given the connectivity 
between property and social order.186 Community engagement and 
communitarian values are not integrated into the bundle of rights 
that inform the core ownership framework because ownership 
models evolved at a time when individual or indeed state 
exploitation of natural resources was deemed to be a social good 
and therefore automatically in the public interest. 
 
186. See Carol M. Rose, Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in NOMOS 
XXXIII: COMPENSATORY JUSTICE 223-47 (John Chapman ed., 1993) (arguing that 
private property is an important component for the maintenance of social and 
political order and proprietary). 
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In a modern context, this must be balanced against the needs 
of our eco-system as a whole.187 Onshore resource development has 
the capacity to devastate communities and landscapes. With this 
in mind, the normative assumptions that have long informed 
public resource frameworks require adjustment. Regulatory 
frameworks need to be updated. In Australia, the importance of 
the public trust doctrine demands reconsideration. Public interest 
responsibilities must be carefully rationalized because now, more 
than ever, property norms need to mirror the contextual ethics 
from which they have evolved.188 
 
 
187. Freyfogle, supra note 18, at 639. For a discussion on the nature and 
scope of land ethics, see Large, supra note 140, at 1082. 
188. Freyfogle, supra note 18, at 637-38 (arguing that “[f]rom earliest-known 
times, human communities found it useful to develop norms authorizing the 
private control of land. . .” These norms were created by the community and “were 
enforced only when and so long as the community stood behind them.”); see also 
Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, 
Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129, 177 (1999) (arguing that 
individuals within communities are capable of working out intricate sets of 
internal rights, responsibilities and overarching norms of expected give and take). 
44https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol34/iss2/4
